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Foreword 
 
 
 
 
 This paper is a sequel to an earlier ICRIER Working Paper titled “Export 
Incentives in India within WTO Framework” by Rajeev Ahuja.  Like India, both Brazil 
and Korea have sought to promote exports through a variety of export incentives. With 
the lowering of tariffs and elimination of many non-tariff barriers, the rationale for giving 
export subsidies has weakened in recent years. Indeed, a decline in export subsidies is 
observed in Brazil, Korea and India.  
 
This study sheds light on the export incentives given by the governments in Brazil 
and Korea and examines their relevance for India. The study finds that export finance has 
been an important instrument of export promotion and still continues to be in vogue. The 
study clearly shows that India should continue to seek improvements in the WTO 
Agreement on Subsidies. It also shows that a generalised form of government support, 
such as through market intelligence, training to exporters, identifying potential markets, 
improving product quality and standards, is the direction to take in promoting exports. 
This is because the generalised support does not invite countervailing duties and also 
benefits small and medium exporters who can ill afford to undertake such activities. The 
study also points out that exports from Brazil and Korea have benefited more from 
production subsidies than exports from India, and that India, like Brazil and Korea, needs 
to quickly graduate to a full-fledged VAT system. 
 
 
 
 
 
Isher Judge Ahluwalia 
Director & Chief Executive 
ICRIER 
 
March 2002 
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Exports Incentives in Brazil and Korea within the WTO Framework 
 
Rajeev Ahuja1 
 
I Introduction 
 
In this paper export promotion programs of Korea and Brazil are analysed with 
the aim of understanding the nature of these programs, and studying their relevance for 
India. Also analysed is the status of the export promotion programs within the WTO 
Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (SCM Agreement), that is, 
studying which of these programs are countervailable under the SCM Agreement and 
which are not. The basic objective of the study is to draw some lessons from these 
international practices for India. Export finance seems to be a preferred mode of 
promoting exports as it has survived the post-WTO era, when export subsidies are in 
general on the decline. Another important finding of the paper is that exports from the 
two countries have benefited, and continue to benefit, not only from export subsidies but 
also from production subsidies. Production subsidies have been quite prevalent both in 
Brazil and Korea. Such subsidies are given through discretionary as well as through well-
established programs. Public enterprises particularly in the steel sector are the major 
beneficiaries of production subsidies. 
 
Given the striking similarities between Brazil and India—both, the continental-
size countries, pursued import substitution, as opposed to export promotion, strategy in 
the 50s, 60s and 70s and also during much of the 80s; during this period both countries 
tried promoting exports through range of export incentives; in both countries state had 
significant presence in economic activities, both pursued economic reforms and 
liberalisation in the early 90s and sought to reduce the role of state and placed greater 
reliance on markets; in both countries exports account for about 10% of its GDP--- 
inclusion of Brazil was a natural choice.2 The choice for Korea is conditioned by the fact 
                                                 
1  The author gratefully acknowledges the help provided by the Embassy of Brazil and the Embassy of 
Korea at New Delhi in furnishing trade related information. Anand Jain provided excellent research 
assistance. 
2  Their share in the world trade is not much different either. However, Brazil’s per capita income is 
considerably higher than that of India. 
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that it is one of the early developing countries to have followed export-oriented strategy, 
as opposed to import substitution strategy adopted by other developing countries. From 
mid-60s onwards, Korea gave several export incentives and was successful in increasing 
exports and achieving higher growth. 
 
The extent to which export incentives or export subsidies promote growth in 
exports from a country is not clear. Nevertheless countries, both developed and 
developing, continue to subsidise their exports in several ways.3 In developing country 
context, removal of anti-export bias (on account of high tariffs, non-tariff barriers, 
overvaluation of currency) that once provided a strong rationale for giving export 
subsidies has only been replaced by the rationale to offset domestic inefficiencies such as 
poor infrastructure, inefficient financial intermediation, and cascading tax structure. 
 
Subsidies in general are considered to have a distorting effect on the economy.4 
On subsidies, the WTO is concerned only with the trade distorting effect of all subsidies-- 
production subsidies as well as export subsidies. Export subsidies distort trade much 
more than production subsidies. Since exports may benefit from both production and 
export subsidies, the WTO Agreement on subsidies disciplines Member countries with 
respect to giving both these types of subsidies. Both these subsidies are countervailable in 
the sense that Member countries can impose duties (known as countervailing duties, 
CVDs for short) against subsidised exports to neutralise the effect of subsidies if such 
subsidies cause injury to the interest of the importing country Member. 
 
Many of the export promotion programs especially of the developing countries 
have been countervailed by the Member countries. Between Jan 1995 and June 2001, 
total of 100 CVD cases were initiated by the developed countries of which 71 were 
                                                 
3  Agricultural subsidies of the US and the EC are, of course, well known. However, this paper deals only 
with non-agricultural export subsidies. To give an example of non-agricultural subsidies given by a 
developed country, the US federal government provides tax shelter to companies having foreign sales 
corporations. This case has been referred to the Dispute Settlement Body of the WTO. 
4  Unless subsidies are meant to encourage activities having positive externalities. Such activities are 
likely to be undersupplied if their provision is solely left to the market. 
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against the developing countries. This could be because the developed country Members 
initiate CVDs more often than the developing country Members (developing countries 
initiated only 27 CVD cases, of which 13 cases were against developing countries) and 
also because subsidies by the developing countries are more overt and common.5 The 
WTO allows for special and differential treatment to the developing country Members 
with respect to the provision of subsidies and the imposition of CVDs. This treatment 
varies even among different developing Member countries. In the next section (section 2) 
we briefly outline the SCM Agreement with the intention of bringing out the difference in 
the special and differential treatment given to countries like Brazil and Korea vis-à-vis 
countries like India. In section 3, after providing a brief historical perspective on the 
export policies of Brazil, we analyse export promotion programs currently being followed 
in the country and their status within the SCM Agreement. Likewise, section 4 is devoted 
to studying the Korean case.6 In section 5 we conclude the paper by drawing some policy 
inferences for India. 
 
 
II Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (SCM Agreement)7 
 
The SCM Agreements broadly consists of two parts. Part one contains disciplines 
on subsidies provisions, and part two deals with the countervailing measures. 
 
Under subsidies provisions (part one), two types of subsidies are prohibited for 
most countries. These are (i) export subsidies (that is, subsidies contingent on export 
performance), and (ii) subsidies that favour use of domestic products over imported 
products. 
 
Export subsidies 
 
For a developed country Member export subsidies are prohibited. If any 
developed country Member is found to be giving export subsidy it can be straightaway 
                                                 
5  These figures are downloaded from the WTO web site: http://www.wto.org 
6  Export promotion programs of India have already been studied in Ahuja (2001). 
7  For a more detailed analysis of the SCM Agreement see Ahuja (2001). 
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taken to the Dispute Settlement Body of the WTO by any Member country.8 However, 
the provisions differ with respect to developing countries. For the developing countries 
listed in Annex VII,9 export subsidies are not prohibited but are actionable. That is, if 
export subsidies are found to be causing injury to the domestic industry of the importing 
Member country, the importing country can impose countervailing duties.10 For 
developing country Members not listed in Annex VII, (referred as “other” developing 
country Members), a period of eight years, from the date of entry into force of the WTO 
Agreement, is given for the removal of such subsidies, with a two year grace period. This 
eight year period ends on December 31, 2002. 
 
 
Subsidies that favour use of domestic products over imported products 
 
Like export subsidies, developed country Members are prohibited from giving 
subsidies that favour use of domestic products over imported products. For all developing 
country Members a five-year period was granted for removal of these subsidies.11 For 
developing country Members, this period lapsed on Jan 1, 2000. Now developing country 
Members are prohibited from giving subsidies that favour use of domestic products over 
imported products. 
 
Since both Korea and Brazil have per capita income greater than US $1000, they 
are therefore outside the group of countries listed in Annex VII of the SCM Agreement.12 
They fall under the category of “other” developing countries and are therefore allowed a 
period of eight years for the removal of export subsidies. On the other type of prohibited 
subsidy (subsidy that favours use of domestic products over imported products) Brazil 
and Korea, like all developing country Members, were required to withdraw in 5-year 
                                                 
8  No injury proof is required in this case. 
9  Annex VII countries are the least-developed country Members as well as developing country Members 
with per-capita income (GNP) less than US$1000. 
10  The conditions under which CVDs can be imposed are defined in the SCM Agreement. 
11  For the least developed country Members a period of eight-year, instead of five-year, is given for the 
removal of subsidies that favours use of domestic products over imported products.  
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12  Brazil has per-capita GDP of $ 4228 and Korea of $ 9600. Of course, India with a per-capita GDP of 
around $ 400 is among the countries listed in Annex VII of the Agreement. 
period ending Jan 1, 2000 any program that encouraged the use of domestic goods over 
imported goods. 
 
Now we turn to the part two of the SCM Agreement that deals with the 
countervailing measures. As in the case of subsidy provisions (part one) where 
developing country Members enjoy special and differential treatment, so is the case with 
respect of disciplines relating to Countervailing Measures (part two). Any countervailing 
duty investigation of a product originating in a developing country Member is terminated 
if: 
 
• the subsidy level does not exceed de minimis level which is 1 percent for a developed 
country Member, 2 percent for “other” developing country Member, and 3 percent for 
Annex VII country Member (if “other” developing country Member eliminated 
export subsidy prior to the expiry of the eight year period the de minimis level would 
be 3 percent, instead of 2 percent); Or 
 
• the volume of subsidised exports represents less than 4 percent of the total imports of 
the like product in the importing Member country, unless imports from developing 
country Members, whose individual shares in total imports represent less than 4 
percent, collectively account for more than 9 percent of total imports of the like 
product in the importing Member. 
 
Having briefly looked at the special and differential treatment given to the 
developing countries in the SCM Agreement, we now turn to export promotion schemes 
of Brazil in the next section and of Korea in the subsequent section. We begin each of 
these sections by outlining briefly the changes on trade front in each country. 
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III Brazil 
 
Brazil’s Trade Policy: A Brief Perspective13 
 
Like India, Brazil also pursued import substitution strategy, and within this 
strategy, it tried promoting its exports through several incentives and through a crawling 
peg exchange rate regime that protected the real exchange rate from inflation. Early 
attempts to promote exports from Brazil can be traced to the 50s when limited tax 
incentives were given to exporters but availing of these incentives was difficult as one 
had to cut through the complex web of bureaucratic controls. However, it was not until 
the early 60s when the government realised the need for promoting exports. This 
realisation came when Brazil ran into BOP problems when it needed to import 
intermediate inputs and primary products that it could not produce domestically. 
Thereafter, in order to promote exports the Brazilian government started giving several 
export incentives such as tax exemptions. For example, exemption of federal value added 
tax, called tax on industrial production (IPI), was given in 1965. In 1967, states followed 
suit and exempted exports from state value added tax, called ICMS. These, together with 
other, incentives did help increase exports from the country, particularly in the early and 
mid 70s, the oil crisis notwithstanding.14 
 
These incentives specifically benefited manufactured exports. In response to the 
external shocks of the early 80s, the Brazilian government further enhanced export 
incentives and sharply devalued the currency. This gave a fillip to manufactured exports 
from Brazil, leading to their seven-fold increase. This improved their share in total 
exports---from 24.1% in 1974 to 49.6% in 1987. Between 1973 and 1987, total exports 
registered a growth of 11.9% per annum. 
 
                                                 
13  For information on Brazil we’ve relied on, among other sources, the working papers of the Institute of 
Brazilian Issues, George Washington University, downloaded from the Institute’s website  
http://www.gwu.edu/~ibi/minerva/pesquisa.html See the reference list at the end of the paper. 
14  Because of high growth rate and low inflation during 1968-1973, this period is also referred to as 
"Economic miracle." 
 6 
According to Pinheiro and Moreira (2000), export subsidies in Brazil averaged 
50% of the value of manufactured exports during the 70s and 80s and were rather costly 
and failed to turn exports into “more than just a poor alternative to domestic policies.”15 
By the end of the 80s, manufactured exports accounted for less than 10% of 
manufactured output. Also, manufactured exports remained highly concentrated. In 1990, 
53 companies accounted for about 44% of all manufactured exports from Brazil. 
 
During 70s and 80s, even though government provided several incentives to 
exporters, the import substitution policy restricted competition through high tariffs that 
made production for domestic market more lucrative than production for exports. Brazil’s 
heavy reliance on foreign firms, particularly in capital intensive sectors, is also 
considered to be a factor that restricted access of its exports to the markets of developed 
countries. Macro economic problems in the 80s, together with the fact that Brazil didn’t 
make long term investments in the upgradation of its production facilities and that it 
lacked strategic vision to focus on products in which it had a comparative advantage, led 
to the decline of the competitiveness of Brazilian exports in the international market since 
mid 80s.16 This was reflected in its declining share in important markets such as US, 
Japan and Germany to other countries. 
 
During 1985 and 1990, Brazil experienced high inflation rate that averaged 856 
percent in sharp contrast to a modest rate of 30 percent during 1965 and 1979.17 High 
inflation necessitated the government to increase its expenditure and also forced it to look 
for ways to curtail the same. This made it difficult for government to support export 
promotion programs, leading to some friction between the state and the business.18 In 
                                                 
15  According to Moreira (1995) these subsidies in case of Korea—a country widely believed to be an 
aggressive exporter—were only 20%, on average, during the same period. 
16  The 80s decade was marked by prolonged crisis with alternate years of growth and recession, and high 
inflation during late 80s. For this reason, the decade of the 1980s and the early 1990s is also referred to 
as the "Lost Decade." 
17  Despite this divergent inflationary experience, the growth rate during these two periods was not 
significantly different (4.5 percent and 5.9 percent respectively). 
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18  In 1988 the country was given a new constitution that transferred significant amount of financial power 
to the states while leaving the responsibility for social programs with the federal government. In an 
1990, real GDP stagnated and it in fact fell in 1992. The economic condition forced the 
Brazilian government to embark on economic liberalisation and reforms program. 
 
In the early 90s, the Brazilian government started economic reforms, that 
comprised trade reforms, privatisation and deregulation. Trade reform on the import side 
saw removal of most non-tariff barriers in 1990, and the announcement of a tariff 
reduction program which brought the average nominal tariff down from 32.2% in 1990 to 
14.2% in 1993. On the export side, subsidies were eliminated and incentives reduced to a 
minimum. Pinheiro et al (2001) report that these incentives fell from an average of 3.1% 
of GDP in 1981-84 to 1.3% in 1990-91. However, the government continued to 
exemption tax on exports and also strengthened export financing schemes. Trade reforms 
also saw establishment of Mercosul: a market with Argentina, Uruguay and Paraguay, 
having common external tariff to be implemented from January 1, 1995.19 Also, with 
financial liberalisation, the Brazilian economy started becoming more financially 
integrated with the world economy. 
 
After the launching of reforms in the early 90s, the earlier rationale for export 
incentives namely to offset export bias, which was so strong in the 70s and 80s was no 
longer valid. Furthermore, the growing pressure on the government to keep its fiscal 
position in control, and the countervailable nature of many export incentives may have 
necessitated the Brazilian government to terminate/withdraw several of its export 
promotion programs that were adopted in the 70s and 80s. The following list provides 
some of the important subsidy programs that were terminated. 
 
• preferential working capital financing for export by CACEX (terminated from August 
30, 1990) 
• over-rebate of state value added tax on goods destined for exports 
                                                                                                                                                 
attempt to stabilise the economy, five new economic plans and four new currencies were adopted within 
a short span of 1986 and 1991 but without any success. 
19  The CET to initially cover 85 percent of 9,000 tariff items, and by 2006 to extend to all items. 
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• preferential financing to exporters if they maintained certain minimum level of 
deposit of foreign exchange (September 20, 1988) 
• export premium for the IPI (May 1, 1985) 
• financing for the storage of merchandise destined for exports 
• income tax exemption for export earnings (April 12, 1990) 
• preferential financing for trading companies (August 31, 1990) 
• preferential price or price equalisation program (February 1986) 
• Preferential medium-and long-term financing for manufactured exports under FINEX 
(October 15, 1990) 
 
Beside trade reforms, the economic reforms included initiation of privatisation 
program in 1990 with the aim to reduce the size of government and to improve its fiscal 
position. Before the 1990s, state-controlled monopolies impeded competition. The 
government had strong presence mainly in heavy chemical industry either through its 
ownership or through its participation (at Federal or State level). As part of reforms, the 
government started withdrawing itself from production through the privatisation program. 
The sectors that it initially focussed on were steel, fertiliser, petrochemicals and aircraft. 
 
However, by June 1994, when inflation skyrocketed and real interest rates soared 
(at 122 percent) overnight, economic stability became the main concern of the 
government. Accordingly, the government with the aim to stabilise the economy adopted 
“Real Plan” that involved undertaking economic restructuring designed to reduce 
inflation, dismantle state control and reduce market barriers and encourage greater private 
sector investment. The exchange rate policy after Real Plan was not linked to export 
promotion and started to reflect more adequately market fluctuation. In 1995, the 
privatisation program was extended to include sectors such as power, financial services, 
railways and mining. 
 
Trade reform enabled exporters to access modern capital goods and inputs at 
international prices. This, coupled with structural changes, increased the potential for 
competition by exposing Brazilian producers to competitive pressures particularly from 
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foreign imports. This led to higher productivity growth and greater specialisation, and 
also gave Brazilian firms stronger incentives and better conditions to penetrate 
international markets. Nevertheless, trade balance in 1995--for the first time in more than 
15 years--turned negative. This was because export growth lagged behind import growth, 
even though Brazilian trade more than doubled—increased from $52 billion to $114 
billion--between 1990 and 1997. Nevertheless, the export concentration was still high. 
Around 1997, about 250 large Brazilian companies accounted for about 85% of Brazil’s 
total exports. 
 
Of course, export growth achieved in the decade between late 80s and late 90s 
was much lower (5.7% per annum) than what was achieved during the prior decade. In 
the 90s, when the pressure on external account started interfering with economic growth, 
the government realised the need for laying special stress on promotion of exports. 
 
Accordingly, in 1997, the Brazilian government came out with the Export 
Promotion Program called (PEE) with the explicit objective of doubling exports by 2002. 
The program was designed to increase exports through the joint effort of the public and 
the private sector. Under this program 56 productive sectors were identified that would 
receive special attention from the government in gaining markets in other countries.20 
These sectors contributed 88% of exports from Brazil in 1997. The management of PEE 
was conducted at two levels. One, through meetings of management teams with the 
President of the Republic, and two through the Chamber of Foreign Trade—CAMEX, 
who was entrusted with the responsibility to co-ordinate the functions of several 
ministries involved in foreign trade, and also to manage, monitor and support the 
program. 
 
In 1997, the Brazilian government also created a new National Export Promotion 
Agency (APEX), aimed at promoting Brazilian products overseas and bringing small-
and-medium businesses into the export business. Several export market development 
                                                 
20  In setting of target and defining a strategy for achieving the target, India is doing in 2002 what Brazil 
started in 1997.  
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trade organisations work with APEX.21 APEX provides matching funds to these 
organisations. The matching funds by APEX cannot be over 50% of the total export 
promotion budget of each organisation. APEX encourages formation of consortia by 
small firms in foreign trade by providing finance for trade missions, fairs and exhibitions. 
APEX operates in each SEBRAE—technical institutions meant for the development of 
micro and small firms (Monteiro 2001). 
 
The second half of the 90s also saw rebuilding of the export financing system on a 
market-friendly basis. Despite the reduction of trade bias a substantial gap between 
internal and external markets prevailed until the devaluation in 1999.22 Even after 
devaluation of the currency by about 50% in January 1999, Brazilian export did not 
increase substantially. In fact, inflation during 1999 and 2000 dampened the effect of 
devaluation.23 
 
Having briefly outlined the changes on trade front in Brazil, we now turn to 
examining selected export incentives of Government of Brazil (GOB), and analyse the 
status of these incentives within the WTO Agreement on Subsidies (SCM Agreement). 
 
 
IV Subsidy Programs of GOB24 
 
Exports can benefit from export subsidies as well as production subsidies. In the 
imposition of countervailing duties (CVDs), the importing country takes both these 
subsidies into account while calculating the duty margin against subsidised exports. 
Brazil has been giving both export subsidies and production subsidies. Even though 
Brazil has terminated many of its export subsidies that were in place in the 70s and 80s, it 
                                                 
21  The Indian counterpart of these organisations are Export Promotion Councils (EPCs). 
22  The devaluation was the direct result of the change in exchange rate regime in response to the Asian 
financial crisis in 1997, which as followed by Russia’s moratorium in mid 1998. This made the 
currency more flexible. 
23  For slow response of exports to the new initiative on trade liberalisation see Pinheiro and Moreira 2000.  
24  Information on subsidy programs has been compiled from several sources, including CVD cases 
imposed against exports from Brazil. 
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still has a few programs that qualify as export subsidies under the SCM Agreement and 
these programs have been countervailed by a few member countries. (See Table 1a for 
the CVD cases currently in force against Brazil.) For example, export finance popularly 
called PROEX that makes finance available to exporters on international terms is an 
export subsidy25. Similarly, exemption of tax/duties on import of equipment and other 
goods not physically incorporated in the production of exports too is an export subsidy. 
We examine these and other schemes in some detail below. 
 
 
Export Promotion Programs26 
 
Advanced Payment Under Foreign Exchange Contract (ACC)/ Advanced Payment 
Under Export Document (ACE): 
 
These are short term financing programs used to help Brazilian exporters. These 
instruments do not depend on government support and can cover a vast range of products, 
including raw materials. They give an edge to exporters once costs are trimmed and 
exporters can pay in longer terms. Private banks are mostly providers of this sort of 
credit, using their own resources as well as foreign funding. Even though ACC is a credit 
given prior to shipment and ACE is given after shipment, both loans can be used in a 
single credit operation. Maximum terms are established by Central Bank. ACC 
operations can be carried out with financing programs of BNDES-Exim as well as 
PROEX. 
 
It duration ranges from 180 days prior to the shipment of goods (ACC) to 180 
days after shipment and before payment by the importer (ACE). This anticipation 
constitutes a financing in national currency of the foreign currency to be received from 
the importer.  
 
                                                 
25  This subsidy was referred to the WTO’s Dispute Settlement Body that considered the earlier version of 
the scheme to be a prohibited subsidy. Brazil has since modified the scheme. 
26  The list of subsidy programs is not exhaustive but covers only important programs. Given the dynamic 
nature of trade policy changes, it is possible if some of these programs discussed in the paper have been 
terminated or discontinued recently. 
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Status of the Program: Even if a financial benefit is conferred under this program 
to the users who are exporters, it cannot qualify as subsidy, let alone export subsidy. This 
is because the agency involved in the program is a non-government agency, namely 
private banks who do not receive any financial support from the government in carrying 
out this program. 
 
Export Financing by Social and Economic Development National Bank (BNDES): 
 
Pre-shipment Financing: Since 1991 only BNDES through a specific program 
called BNDES-exim, gives loans to production destined to export using instruments that 
are similar to those from the international market. 
 
Mostly loans can cover up to 100% of the value of the operation and a 30-month 
term (including grace period); it depends on production cycle. The interest rate covers 
financial costs plus basic spread and risk spread. Thus, interest rate is normally 
LIBOR+1% (basic spread)+risk spread. 
 
Post-shipment Financing: The BNDES, using internal or external resources, 
finances exports of goods and services bringing the same competitiveness of the 
international market. Almost all products can be financed as well as services associated 
with those products. The financing can achieve 100% in terms of export value and the 
term range may vary from 60 days to 12 years. The interest rate includes 
LIBOR+1%+spread. BNDES also takes part in post-shipment financing through PROEX, 
used as interest-rate equalisation. 
 
Status of the program: BNDES is a government agency. Under this program, its 
loans, at least foreign currency denominated loans have not been found to be conferring 
financial benefit to its recipients (as the rates have been found to be above the benchmark 
rates). Therefore its loans (at least foreign currency loans) do not qualify the subsidy test 
even though these loans are meant for exporters only. 
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Guarantee Fund for Competitive Promotion (FGPC) 
 
This instrument, managed by BNDES, is meant to complement guarantees 
required to obtain pre-shipment financing from BNDES for export operations. This 
instrument is mainly for small businesses whether exporters or those involved in 
production of inputs used by exporters. FGPC covers risk of credit used (i) for expansion, 
relocation or modernisation of plant with the aim of improving its competitiveness (ii) for 
production for exports (iii) for buying capital goods or install outlays, and (iv) to meet 
working capital associated with financing.   
 
Status of the program: Since the details about the terms of this program are not 
known it is not possible to evaluate the status of this program under the SCM Agreement. 
Going by the BNDES provision of pre-shipment credit, which doesn’t confer any 
financial contribution, one can infer that this program too is most unlikely to confer any 
financial benefit to those who avail of credit guarantee from BNDES. 
 
Preferential Export Financing under the PROEX Program 
 
PROEX was established in June 1991 to substitute another program, called 
FINEX. Its objective is to support Brazilian exports of goods and services by giving its 
exporters the financial conditions of the international market. This program for financing 
is supported by the national treasury resources. It is operated in two systems: PROEX-
Financing and PROEX-Equalisation. In both cases the exporter gets paid immediately. 
The financing is operated exclusively by Banco do Brazil, acting as Brazilian Treasury 
agent, in which it is possible to finance up to 85% of export value in the negotiated 
INCOTERM. The repayment period varies from 60 days to 10 years depending on the 
degree of industrialisation required for production. 
 
PROEX-Financing: Under this program loans are given to exporters (supplier’s 
credit) or foreign buyers (buyer’s credit). The bank of Brazil has authority to decide on 
credit operations only up to a certain amount ($8 million), beyond which the cases are 
referred to a council called CCEx (Exports Credit Committee) which scrutinises the 
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application. In order to finance 85% of the export value, the PROEX rules demand that at 
least 60% of components must be Brazilian. 
 
PROEX-Equalisation: In the equalisation funding is provided by commercial 
banks that provide loans to exporters or importer of Brazilian goods and services. In this 
system the Brazilian Treasury pays part of the expenses in order to equalise the 
differences between the maximum reference rates previously determined by BACEN 
(Brazilian Central Bank) and the minimum interest rate used internationally for financing. 
The payment is made through the Bank of Brazil to international or Brazilian banks. The 
equalisation is paid in case of supplier’s credit as well as buyer’s credit and the credit 
terms are the same as PROEX-Financing. 
 
Status of the program: In 1999, a WTO panel found PROEX interest equalisation 
payments used to finance the sale of regional aircraft manufactured in Brazil to be a 
prohibited export subsidy because of the local content requirement condition. The WTO 
Appellate Body upheld this finding. The Government of Brazil modified PROEX to bring 
it into conformity with WTO subsidy rules, but Canada challenged the modified scheme 
also in the WTO. The United States intervened in this challenge as a third party and also 
expressed some concerns about the adequacy of Brazil's implementation of the panel's 
findings. Whatever be the status of the modified program, this program even without 
local content requirement is definitely an export subsidy and therefore countervailable 
under the SCM Agreement. 
 
Export Credit Insurance by Brazilian Export Credit Insurance Company (SBCE) 
 
Export credit insurance protects the financial interest of exporters in the event of 
default on the part of importers. Since purchase of insurance involves vetting of the 
financial health of the importer, this also helps in the screening of buyers. Besides, it can 
be used as a debt-collecting instrument. In Brazil, export credit insurance is provided by a 
private company (SBCE) that has many Brazilian companies as its shareholders. It 
provides insurance cover up to 85% of the credit against commercial risks and 90% 
against political and extraordinary risks. 
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 Status of the program: In Brazil, this instrument is managed by the Brazilian 
Export Credit Insurance Company (SBCE), which is a private company. Since the 
company doesn’t depend on any financial support from the government in providing 
credit insurance, no financial benefit is deemed to be conferred. Hence the program does 
not qualify as a subsidy. 
 
 
Tax Exemptions 
 
Export of goods and services are not levied many taxes such as IPI (Industrial 
Product Tax), ICMS (Sales Tax), COFINS (Contribution to Social Security Financing), 
and PIS (Social Integration Program Tax). All these taxes represent roughly 30% of 
product price in the internal market. Goods that are expected to be re-exported are also 
exempted from import tariffs. 
 
Brazilian IPI (Industrial Product Tax) is a federal value-added tax levied on most 
domestic and imported manufactured products. This tax is assessed either at the point of 
sale by the manufacturer or processor, with respect to domestically produced goods, or at 
the point of Brazilian Customs clearance, in case of imports. A counterpart of IPI at state 
level is ICMS.  
 
The PIS/PASEP and COFINS are monthly federal social contributions, calculated 
as a percentage of sales. The contributions are due with respect to each local transaction, 
usually included in sales price to customers, then remitted to federal government social 
contribution fund. 
 
Status of the program: Exemption, refund or remission of all indirect taxes such 
as import duties, value added taxes paid on the inputs used in the production of exports is 
allowed under the SCM Agreement. Since IPI and ICMS are in the nature of indirect 
taxes, their exemption on exports doesn’t constitute a subsidy. In the context of CVD, 
taxes on revenues such as PIS and COFINS too are considered in the nature of indirect 
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taxes and not direct taxes. For this reason exemption of exports from these taxes is 
allowed under the SCM Agreement and therefore not considered to be countervailable. 
Since Brazil has value added tax system in place, the case for any excess of refund of 
these taxes is rather weak.27 
 
Drawback Regime 
 
The following three types of Drawback systems are available to Brazilian 
exporters: 
 
Drawback Suspension: Raw materials and goods imported and exported after an 
industrial process are free of import duty, IPI and ICMS. The permission of this regime is 
ruled by the Foreign Trade Office (DECEX) of the Ministry of Industry and Commerce 
which verifies all the plan of exportation. 
 
Drawback Exemption: An exemption of import duty, IPI and ICMS are allowed 
on importation of raw materials and goods in order to replace the stock of a company, 
after an industrial process and consequently exportation of products. The raw materials 
and goods have to be equal in quantity and quality of the products used before. Similar to 
the Suspension regime DECEX rules the permission to import under an exemption. In 
this particular case the importer has to prove with the export documents the exportation 
made before. 
 
Drawback Refund: In the case of regular importation of raw materials and other 
goods submitted to an industrial process and then exported, the importer can request (in 
90 days) to the tax authorities for a refund. The importer has to prove the importation and 
the exportation of the products with the import and export declarations and also the tax 
payment forms. If the request is approved, the importer will get a Tax Credit Certificate 
to be used on next importation. 
                                                 
27  These taxes have not even been included in the list of programs alleged to have provided countervailing 
subsidies in the initiation of CVD case by the US against import of Carbon and Certain Alloy Steel 
Wire Rod from Brazil. The Initiation of the Countervailing Duty Investigations  (2001) can be 
downloaded from  http://ia.ita.doc.gov/frn/0110frn/01-24503.txt 
 17 
 Status of the program: The first two schemes are quite similar to those followed 
in India. Drawback suspension is similar to Advance Licence (AL) scheme in India and 
the Drawback Exemption is similar to Duty Free Replenishment Certificate (DFRC) in 
India. However, the difference is in the third scheme. Although the Drawback Refund 
system in Brazil appears quite close to the Indian Duty Entitlement Pass Book (DEPB) 
scheme, the essential difference lies in the fact that the scheme is based on the taxes 
actually paid by the exporters since the exporters are required to furnish tax payment 
forms. 
 
Exemption of IPI and Import Duties on Imports Under Decree/Law 2324 (E) 
 
This Law provides exporters of manufactured products exemptions from IPI and 
duties on imported spare parts and machinery. 
 
Status of the program: This program is countervailable because it allows duty free 
import of goods not physically incorporated into the production of exports and thereby 
confers financial benefit to exporters. Since this is contingent on export performance it 
constitutes an export subsidy and hence is countervailable. 
 
Minerals Tax Incentive 
 
GOB establishes a tax on minerals call IUM. This tax is lower for iron ore pellets 
sold domestically than for exported pellets. Payment of IUM exempts the firms from all 
other taxes except the income tax and all charges for the use of public services. This 
exemption includes social security taxes and property taxes. 
 
Status of the program: The IUM exempts the firms from direct taxes (such as 
social security taxes) and because the tax rate is lower for export than for domestic sales, 
the program confers financial benefit to the exporters of the product. Since the benefit is 
linked to the export performance the program is deemed to be an export subsidy and 
hence countervailable. 
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Regionally specific programs 
 
Program for Development of backward regions (SUDENE and SUDAM) 
 
SUDENE and SUDAM program were created to promote the development of 
Brazil’s Northeast region and Amazonia region respectively. Both these programs are 
administered by the Federal government and allow either a partial or complete tax 
exemption on the standard income tax for Brazilian companies. Under both the programs, 
companies are allowed 100 percent tax exemption if they make initial investment in these 
regions, increases capacity in the applicable region, or modernises its facilities in the 
specific region. Companies that do not meet these criteria are allowed partial tax 
exemption on income from facilities in these regions.  
 
Status of the programs: Under the SCM Agreement, government 
assistance/incentives meant for the development of backward regions was considered to 
be non-specific subsidy and hence non-actionable for the first five years from the date of 
entry into force of the WTO Agreement.28 This period lapsed from January 1, 2000. All 
government subsidies meant for the development of backward region are now considered 
to be a specific subsidy. Under SUDENE and SUDAM, tax exemption on income 
generated in these regions amounts to forging revenue due to the government and thereby 
conferring financial benefit. Since this benefit is given only to the units located in these 
regions, the benefit is regionally specific and hence countervailable. 
 
Special Free-trade Zones  
 
As in many developing countries, Brazil too has special free-trade zones, denoted 
as ZPEs. These zones are considered to be outside the Brazilian territory for purposes of 
customs control. Products manufactured in ZPEs are for export only and their import into 
Brazilian territory is strictly prohibited. Currently, there are four ZPEs in Brazil. 
                                                 
28  Along with government subsidies for regional development, two other types of government subsidies 
were not considered to be specific, and hence non-actionable. These are: research and development 
assistance and assistance for promoting investment in environmentally sound technologies. Since no 
further action was taken in extending this provision, all these types of subsidies are now considered as 
specific and hence are actionable. 
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Companies operating in ZPEs are offered exemption for 20 years from import duties and 
from customs and administrative restrictions and controls for goods imported or exported. 
These companies pay income tax according to the rules applicable to Brazilian 
companies, except for depreciation of imported goods, which is non-deductible. 
 
Status of the program: The companies located in these zones are free from import 
duties, customs control and restrictions. To the extent the freedom from such controls and 
restrictions also apply to import of capital goods and equipment that is not generally 
applicable to companies outside these zones, the companies stands to financially benefit 
by locating in these zones. Since the financial benefit is specifically given to companies 
located in the designated zones, the benefit constitutes regional subsidy and hence 
countervailable. However, part of this financial benefit gets offset by the fact that 
depreciation on imported goods in these zones is not allowed, as is the case otherwise. 
 
Programs meant to encourage import substitution 
 
Accelerated Depreciation for Brazilian-Made Capital Goods 
 
Under this program any company that purchases Brazilian made equipment and 
has an expansion project approved by the Industrial Development Council (CDI) may 
depreciate this equipment at twice the rate normally permitted under the Brazilian tax 
laws. 
 
Status of the program: Allowing higher depreciation on selected equipment 
confers financial benefit on the user of such equipment. Since the benefit is available 
only on Brazilian made equipment the program clearly favours use of Brazilian made 
equipment over imported equipment. Therefore, the program is deemed to encourage 
import substitution and hence specific. Any subsidy program that favour use of domestic 
products over imported products is prohibited since January 1, 2000 for countries like 
Brazil that fall under “other” developing countries category.29 
 
                                                 
29  The least-developed country Members are given eight-year period to eliminate these subsidies. 
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Financing for the Acquisition or Lease of Machinery and Equipment through Special 
Agency for Industrial Financing: 
 
This program called FINAME is administered through BNDES and other agent 
banks in Brazil. Under this program capital financing is given to companies in Brazil for 
the acquisition or leasing of new machinery and equipment. This financing is mostly 
provided for machinery and equipment manufactured in Brazil. This facility is given on 
non-Brazilian machinery and equipment only when such machinery and equipment is not 
manufactured in Brazil.  
 
Status of the program: Since capital finance under this program is available on 
preferential terms, it confers financial benefit to its recipient. Moreover, since this facility 
is generally given only on Brazilian machines and equipment, the program is deemed to 
encourage import substitution and hence specific. For these reasons the program 
constitutes a subsidy within the meaning of the SCM Agreement and hence 
countervailable. This subsidy program has become prohibited since January 1, 2000. 
 
In addition to the above mentioned programs, Brazil has other programs that are 
in the nature of production subsidies. For example, incentives ranging from equity 
infusion on terms inconsistent with the commercial considerations to infrastructure 
support to fiscal benefits to selected industries/firms or for the development of 
geographical regions to loans/credit given on preferential terms to selected 
industries/firms. Exports that have benefited from these programs too have been 
countervailed by some member countries. Also, doubts have been raised on the Brazil’s 
privatisation program by the Member countries. 
 
Production Subsidies 
 
Going by the number and the range of subsidy programs, production subsidies 
seem to be more common than export subsidies in Brazil. Production subsidies take both 
non-recurring and recurring forms. Non-recurring subsidies are given in the form of 
equity infusion, debt forgiveness, debt to equity swap, and long-term financing while 
recurring subsidies are given in the form of fiscal benefits through a variety of 
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exemptions and rebates of indirect taxes such as import duties, federal and state value 
added taxes. Production subsidies are especially targeted to benefit selected industries. In 
Brazil the four industries that have specifically been given government support are 
aircraft, automobile, shipbuilding and steel. 
 
It is observed that government has had significant presence in certain basic 
industries especially the steel industry. The steel industry is given special benefits by the 
government in a variety of forms such as injection of equity, infrastructure support. 
Admittedly, there may be a bias for steel industry since a number of CVDs cases have 
come up against steel exports from several countries, and therefore government subsidy 
programs to the steel industry have come to light. Such benefits may actually be common 
in other industries as well, particularly those in which government has significant 
presence. 
 
Some of the major programs of GOB meant to benefit the steel industry/firms are 
listed below: 
  
• Disproportionate lending to the steel sector through BNDES 
• Debt-to-Equity Conversions to COSIPA in 1992 and 1993 
• Equity Infusions/Debt Forgiveness to Usina in 1988 
• Equity Infusion to a pipe company and to certain steel companies 
• Government provision of operating capital 
• IPI rebate for capital investments in steel industry 
• Program to benefit upstream suppliers of steel inputs 
• Provision of infrastructure (subsidised port facilities and transport subsidies) 
 
Since the focus of the paper is not on production subsidies but on export subsidies 
we do not study these programs here. Given the importance of the GOB privatisation 
program with respect to the steel companies (as exports from these companies have been 
countervailed), we outline the privatisation program below. 
 
GOB Privatisation of Steel Companies 
 
In 1974, two government-owned steel companies, referred as COSIPA and CSN, 
were transferred to another government holding company referred as SIDERBRAS. In 
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the same year a majority interest of USIMINAS, a steel joint venture in which the 
government was one of the stakeholders, too was transferred to SIDERBRAS. In 1990, 
when the government started privatisation program it decided to put SIDERBRAS, 
including its operating companies, into liquidation. Accordingly, in 1991, USIMINAS 
was partially privatised, and in 1993, both COSIPA and CNS were partially privatised. In  
1994 additional government-held shares in all the three companies were sold. 
 
After this, the new ownership pattern that emerged was such that USIMINAS had 
significant ownership in COSIPA, sufficient to influence the functioning of the latter.  
Similarly, in the case of CSN, the two entities that had significant ownership in CSN also 
had meaningful holdings in both USIMINAS and COSIPA. This complicated structure 
made it difficult to ascertain the financial benefit given to individual companies prior to 
1992 (prior to their privatisation) when all three companies received equity infusion and 
credit from the GOB on terms inconsistent with the normal commercial decisions. Prior 
to their privatisation, GOB debt-for-equity swaps provided to COSIPA and CNS, were 
made on inconsistent terms. These companies continue to benefit from such inconsistent 
commercial practices of the GOB made in the past. Therefore exports from these 
companies have been countervailed. We now turn to the Korea case. 
 
 
V Korea 
 
Korea’s Trade Policy: A Brief Perspective30 
 
Korea has been successful in achieving high export and economic growth in the 
60s and 70s. For example, exports climbed from $ 175 million to $5 billion between 1965 
and 1975, and further to $20 billion by 1981. In increasing its exports, the Korean 
government is considered to have played a crucial role in which it switched from import 
substitution strategy pursued during 1948-1962 to export promotion or export-orientated 
strategy. The Korean government relied extensively on export promotion measures with 
                                                 
30  For an excellent monograph on Korea’s Trade and Industrial Policies from 1948 to 1998, see Sohn et al 
(1998). For this section is partly drawn from the monograph. 
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the aim of increasing exports from the country. Sohn et al (1998) lists export promotion 
measures that the government introduced during 1962-1972. These are: 
 
• Preferential export credits  
• Tariff exemptions on the imports of intermediate goods used export production 
• Reductions of taxes on export income 
• Linking import permits and quotas to export performance 
• Exemptions from tariffs and indirect taxes for domestic suppliers of intermediate 
goods used for export production 
• Accelerated depreciation for fixed assets of major export industries etc. 
 
Besides, in 1965 the government devaluated the won and this improved 
competitiveness of the Korean industry. Government also invested in improving 
infrastructure facilities such as ports, power plants and highways. According to Soha et al 
(1998) firms producing goods for exports could borrow official interest rate that was 
lower than market rate. The difference between these two rates was as high as 18.5% in 
1968. The basic system remained in place till early 1980s. Besides giving these 
incentives, the government also set up a system whereby export targets were set up by 
exporting firms, and government periodically reviewed these targets in its trade 
promotion meetings. 
 
To what extent these measures helped Korea achieve high export growth has 
remained a controversial and unsettled issue. At one extreme, the view is that high export 
growth wouldn’t have been possible without government’s role in export promotion and 
in providing stable macro economic environment (Wade 1990). The other extreme view 
is that export promotion measures at best had a limited impact in achieving high export 
growth in Korea. High export growth, according to this view, was the result of policies 
that encouraged investment in the country (Rodrik 1995). Both these view relate to 
“supply side” factors. A different view that has also been put forward stresses not so 
much on the “supply side” factors but on the “demand side” conditions. This view is 
based on the argument that the impetus for export growth came from the external sources, 
in particular from Japan (Castley 1995). 
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In sharp contrast to the export promotion policy of the 60s, the government in 70s 
targeted the development of heavy manufacturing and chemical industries (HCI). Giving 
incentives by way of finance was the most important way in which development of HCI 
was promoted. Strong emphasis given to large enterprises and chaebols. This adversely 
affected the light manufacturing industries and resulted in lack of development of small 
and medium-sized enterprises. This was only to be expected as resources got diverted 
towards developing HCI. This led to an unbalanced development. To correct this 
imbalance created by the previous government due to its strong intervention policies, the 
new government that took charge moved away from the intervention policy and towards 
greater reliance on the market in the period 1980 to 1993. During this period, the 
government pursued a wide range of market liberalisation policies. It started deregulating 
financial sector and undertook import liberalisation. Steps taken to severe the ties 
between the government and businesses during this period were not very successful as 
informal ties remained in place. 
 
During 1994-1997, Korea moved towards globalisation by joining the WTO, 
APEC and the OECD. It further liberalised trade and modified its trade and industrial 
policies to make them WTO consistent. For example, Korea abolished the direct export 
subsidies. Four subsidies that violated WTO regulation, Korea eliminated by 1998. These 
subsidies are: 
 
• Reserves for Export Losses31 
• Reserves for Overseas Market Development32 
• Facility Investment Loans provided by the Small and Medium Enterprises Foundation 
Fund 
                                                 
31  A domestic person or a corporation engaged in foreign exchange earning business was allowed to 
establish a reserve amounting to the lesser of one percent of foreign exchange earning or 50 per cent of 
net income for the respective tax year. If certain export losses occurred, these could be offset using 
money in the reserve fund. Any amount that was not used to offset a loss was to be returned to the 
income account and taxed over a three-year period, after a one-year grace period. All of the money in 
the reserve would eventually go into income account and subjected to corporate tax either when it is 
used to offset export losses or when the grace period expired and the funds were returned to taxable 
income. Deferral of taxes owed to government amounted to an interest-free loan in the amount of the 
company’s tax savings. This program is an export subsidy as it is contingent upon export performance 
and confers financial benefit to its recipient. 
32  Similar to Reserves for Export Losses outlined in the previous footnote. 
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• Tax Credit for Investment in Facilities33 
 
In 1997, the Asian Crisis began in Thailand in July 1998 and spread to Korea 
towards the end of 1997. With capital flight from the economy, many weaknesses of the 
economy, particularly the cosy relationship between the government and chaebols were 
exposed and this in turn fuelled capital flight from the country, depleting Korea’s foreign 
exchange reserves. The situation turned so precarious that it had to sign standby 
arrangement with the IMF. Subsequent to that, interest rate increased and banks became 
more reluctant to lend.  This credit crunch caused recession in Korea when imports of all 
kinds of goods declined and export failed to pick up despite more than 40% depreciation 
in the won. The government used the crisis as an opportunity to carry forward market-
oriented reforms, to restructure its trade and industrial policies, and to correct several 
economic weaknesses present in the country such as distorted industrial development, 
which it tried to correct by promoting the development of small and medium enterprises. 
With this brief outline, we turn to the main export promotion measures of the 
Government of Korea (GOK) in the section below. 
 
 
Government Subsidy Programs 
 
Duty Drawback on Non-Physically Incorporated Items and Excessive Loss Rates: 
 
Under the Korean Customs Act, Korean exporters may receive an excessive 
abatement, exemption, or refund of import duties payable on raw materials used in the 
production of exported goods. It has been found that the drawback on imported raw 
materials when the raw materials are not physically incorporated into the exported item 
sometime results in excessive drawback duty.  
 
Even though in working out the usage rate of inputs for manufacturing of one unit 
of output, recoverable scrap is also taken into the calculations, it sometimes results in 
                                                 
33  The companies in Korea were allowed to claim tax credits for various kinds of investments. If the tax 
credits cannot be used at the time they are claimed, the company is authorised to carry them forward for 
use in later tax years. Because Korean companies received a higher tax credit for investments made in 
domestically produced facilities, investment tax credits received under several Articles constituted an 
import substitution subsidy.  
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excessive drawback. The GOK comes out with average raw material usage rates and such 
rates are periodically revised. This is done for all products under Korea’s duty drawback 
regime. Producers with stable technology can use these rates. However, if a producer 
becomes appreciably more efficient than the average, it is supposed to use its own rate. If, 
upon inspection, a producer is found to be overcompensated for its duty drawback, it is 
liable for a penalty assessment. According to GOK, only physically incorporated raw 
materials are eligible for drawback and that this rule applies to all merchandise exported 
from Korea. 
 
In exports of industrial belts and stainless steel cooking ware drawback received 
was found to be excessive and therefore countervailed. In case of certain steel products it 
was not found to be excessive and therefore not countervailed. Therefore whether there is 
an excessive drawback seems to vary from product to product. 
 
Fixed Amount Refund System (FARS) 
 
This scheme is similar to DEPB refund scheme of India. Under this scheme there 
is no obligation to import any inputs for the production of the exported product. Whether 
this scheme is currently being practised is not known but the scheme has been 
countervailed by EC not long ago in 1999. 
 
Status of the Scheme: Like DEPB scheme in India, EC considers the FARS to be neither 
a duty drawback scheme nor a substitution drawback scheme within the meaning of the 
SCM Agreement. Therefore the entire financial benefit given under the scheme is 
considered to be a financial contribution made by the GOK. Since the refund is based on 
the FOB value of exports, the scheme is considered to be based on export performance 
and hence deemed to be specific. The issue of excess remission is not examined at all. As 
per this interpretation, even if the refund under the scheme is less than the import duties 
actually paid on import of goods actually used in production of exports, the scheme 
would still be considered countervailable.  
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Export Credit Financing from Export-Import Bank of Korea (KXMB) 
 
In 1973, GOK established a fund called the National Investment Fund (NIF) 
through which funds were given to banks for the purpose of loan. These funds are used to 
finance development or to finance exports on a deferred payment basis. Only deferred 
export financing through NIF is wholly administered by the Export-Import Bank of 
Korea. The KXMB provides two types of export credit (i) a pre-delivery loan to cover the 
period of construction of the project, and (ii) a deferred export credit in the form of a 
post-delivery loan for ten years including a two-year grace period.  
 
Status of the program: Because the loans are contingent upon export and the rates are less 
than those on comparable commercial financing, these loans confer financial benefit to its 
recipient and therefore constitute an export subsidy. 
 
Export financing loan 
 
There are two types of trade financing programs: production financing and raw 
material financing. A bank provides production financing when a company needs funds 
for the production of export merchandise or the production of raw materials used in the 
production of exported merchandise. 
 
Status of the program: The program is countervailable because the interest rates charged 
on the loans were less than what a firm would have had to pay on a comparable short-
term commercial loan. 
 
Export Credit Insurance by the Export-Import Bank of Korea 
 
The KXMB operates an export insurance program which provides commercial, 
political and managerial risk insurance. A separate budget for this program is maintained 
by the KXMB. Purchase of this insurance is compulsory on all loans provided by the 
KXMB. 
 
 28 
Status of the program: To be a subsidy, a government-operated export insurance program 
has to charge premiums which are adequate to cover the long-term operating costs and 
losses of the program. Because the premiums charged to exporters allow the KXMB to 
cover its losses and its long-term operating expenses, this program is determined not to 
constitute a subsidy. 
 
Export Guarantees from the KXMB 
 
The KXMB provides guarantees for exports of large capital goods and project, 
and no guarantee are offered for sales of consumer goods. Due to non-availability of 
information regarding the terms of these Guarantees an assessment cannot be made about 
the status of this program within the SCM Agreement. 
 
Tax Incentives 
 
GOK used to give several tax incentives to achieve specific national economic 
objectives under the Tax Exemption and Reduction Control Law (TERCL) under its 
various Articles and Foreign Investment Promotion Act (FIPA). However, on January 1, 
1999 the Act was replaced by the Special Tax Treatment Control Law (STTCL) and from 
May 1999, FIPA too was subsumed into STTCL. All tax incentives under STTCL 
already have sunset rules whereby an incentive comes to an end after the expiry of certain 
period, unless it’s extended. 
 
With this replacement of TERCL with STTCL, many programs under TERCL 
that were deemed to be countervailable have been withdrawn and the tax incentives given 
under STTCL are non-specific in nature.34 However, these programs have yet to be 
evaluated in the CVD investigations. If exports continue to benefit from a government 
program that once existed but doesn’t exist anymore, the benefit from that program is still 
countervailed even after the program is withdrawn. In the recent CVD investigations tax 
incentives under TERCL may be countervailed if the lingering effect of those programs 
continue to benefit exports. 
                                                 
34  We are not analysing here various incentives given under TERCL that have been countervailed. 
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 GOK claims that most of the tax incentives now given under STTCL are based on 
objective criteria. For example, tax incentives to small and medium-sized enterprises is 
based on the number of employees or the amount of capital or turnovers. 
 
In case of Korea it has been observed that many government program that prime 
facie appeared to be non-specific were upon closer examination found to be de facto 
specific. Therefore, specificity test becomes the crucial issue here. This is particularly so 
with programs that define eligibility criteria (horizontal in scope and neutral in 
application) in such a way as to benefit only selected industries. In the last 5 years or so, 
the US has been the only country that has imposed CVDs against exports from Korea, 
and these duties are invariably against steel exports from Korea. See Table 2 for CVDs 
cases Korea.35 
 
Export Credit Insurance 
 
Korea export insurance corporation (KEIC) is Korea’s official export credit 
insurance institution. KEIC is a specialised non-profit corporation under the guardian 
authority of the Ministry of Commerce, Industry and Energy. Its operations has the 
sovereign guarantee of the government. KEIC helps in promotion of exports by providing 
export insurance. During 2000, it supported 17.9% of Korea’s total exports. Korea's 
official export credit insurance institution. The GOK provides annual contributions to an 
export insurance program.  
 
Status of the program: Information on individual insurance schemes of KEIC is not 
available therefore, assessing whether KEIC is making profit or loss on individual 
schemes is not possible. Whatever the case be, it is reasonable to expect that in its overall 
                                                 
35 From January 1, 1995 to June 30, 2001, EC had initiated 5 CVD cases against South Korea, but these 
cases were dropped because the subsidy levels were found to be de minimis. 
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operations it is breaking even. The scheme has also not been countervailed in any CVD 
investigations.36 
 
 
Production Subsidies 
 
The following production subsidies are either currently being given or were given 
till recently by the GOK. Such subsidies are both recurring and non-recurring in nature. 
Also, these scheme are ad hoc/discretionary as well as given through well-defined 
programs. 
 
The Government of Korea’s Direction of credit 
 
In the past, GOK had a strong control over its financial sector. In the 80s, as a part 
of GOK’s strategy to liberalise the economy, it started reducing its control over the 
financial sector in general and the banking sector in particular. It tried introducing 
reforms in the sector in the late 80s and the early 90s. But such attempts were either 
abandoned or proved to be unsuccessful--only that the formal controls were replaced by 
informal controls. In the 90s as well, government continued to wield control, directly or 
indirectly, over the lending practices of government owned banks and other domestic 
banks.37 It directed credit to specific sector, often to specific companies. The steel 
industry was one of the major beneficiaries of such government directed lending.38 
 
To the extent that interest rate charged on directed loans was less than the interest 
rates on comparable commercial loans, the regulated loans conferred a benefit on the 
recipients. Steel producers were one of the major beneficiaries of such loans. These loans 
have been countervailed as production subsidy and not an export subsidy. The US has 
                                                 
36  Details about (i) special depreciation as a tax deductible cost contingent on exports and (ii) export 
industry facility loans could not be obtained. So these programs are not discussed. 
37  Loan from the Korean branches of foreign banks was not subject to the government’s control and 
direction. Therefore such loan did not confer benefit to the recipient of such loans and hence were not 
countervailed.  
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38  After the 1997 financial crisis, GOK liberalise its financial sector a great deal. The government under a 
number of steps: announced closure of some banks, launched the financial supervisory commission to 
monitor the competitiveness of financial institutions, liberalised foreign currency transactions, 
introduced a new foreign investment promotion act for direct foreign loans to Korean companies. 
countervailed imports of different steel products from Korea. This is because Korean 
steel exports have benefited from government subsidies, both production subsidies and 
export subsidies. Production subsidies appear to have benefited steel exports from Korea 
more than export subsidies. This could be because steel is being produced mainly by 
public sector companies who are given both discretionary and non-discretionary benefits. 
 
A government-owned steel company, called POSCO, has benefited by the 
government in several ways: ranging from infrastructure development primarily used by 
POSCO or POSCO being given favourable treatment in respect of use of the 
infrastructure facilities to making finance available on terms inconsistent with 
commercial considerations etc. It has also been subjected to government control as seen 
in the POSCO’s pricing policy. We mention below some of the ways through which 
POSCO was conferred financial benefit and this benefit qualified as a subsidy under the 
SCM Agreement. 
 
POSCO’s provision of steel inputs for less than adequate remuneration 
 
POSCO is the only Korean producer of hot-rolled stainless steel coil, which is the 
main input used in the merchandise subjected to CVDs. During the period of 
investigation, POSCO sold hot-rolled coil to Inchon products that were consumed in 
Korea as well as used in the subject merchandise. GOK through its ownership and control 
of POSCO set prices of steel inputs used by the Korean steel industry at less than 
adequate remuneration. In May 1999, POSCO switched over from it’s two tiered pricing 
system, that explicitly favoured its output used for exports, and established unit prices 
applicable for sales to all customers. This change in pricing didn’t alter the fact that the 
price set is less than adequate remuneration thereby conferring benefit to all Korean Steel 
Exporters buying from POSCO. Under the two-tier pricing system, the program was both 
a production subsidy and an export subsidy. But after POSCO switched over to a unit 
price, the program is deemed to be a production subsidy only and hence is still 
countervailable. 
  
 32 
GOK infrastructure investment at Kwangyang Bay 
 
GOK infrastructure investments at Kwangyang Bay over the period 1983-1991, 
predominantly benefited POSCO. Hence the benefit was deemed specific and hence 
countervailable under the SCM Agreement.  
 
Exemption of Bond Requirement for Port Use of Asan Bay 
 
GOK made investments for development of infrastructure at Asan Bay. GOK had 
built port berths in the Poseung area. In 1997, POSCO signed a three-year lease 
agreement with the Inchon Port Authority for the exclusive use of one of the port berths, 
constructed by the GOK, and paid the applicable user fee. In the same year, GOK entered 
into a lease agreement for the exclusive use of the other port berths with a consortium of 
six companies. The consortium of companies was required to purchase bonds, which the 
GOK would repay without interest after the lease expired in 10 years. However, POSCO 
was not required to purchase a bond for the exclusive use of port berth. Since the waiver 
of the bond purchase was only provided to POSCO, the program was deemed to be 
specific and moreover, since the waiver conferred financial benefit by forgoing collecting 
of revenue the waiver was considered a subsidy. 
 
These are some of the ways through which financial benefit was conferred on 
government-owned POSCO. However, production subsidies are not confined to 
providing benefit to POSCO alone. Such subsidies are provided fairly widely and in 
numerous ways. Some of these ways are listed below: 
 
• Electricity Discounts under Request Load Adjustment Program (RLA) 
• Private Capital Inducement Act 
• Energy-Savings Facilities Investment Reserve Funds 
• Industry Promotion and Research and Development Subsidies 
• Scrap Reserve Fund 
• Overseas Resource Development Program39 
• Technical Development Reserve Funds40 
                                                 
39  Overseas Resource Development Program. Loans under this program are although not contingent on 
export performance are subsidies since these are available on terms that confer financial benefit on its 
recipients. 
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• Finance by Export-Import Bank of Korea to encourage investments abroad41 
• Loans to Promising Small and Medium Enterprises 
• Asset Revaluation 
 
 
Regional Subsidies 
 
Besides, there are regionally specific subsidies to courage investments in certain 
regions or to encourage relocation of industry from large cities to places outside 
metropolitan areas. One such program is designated as special cases of tax for balanced 
Development among areas. Preferential treatment given to the units located in Export 
promotion Zones or Special Economic Zones with respect to charging rents or certain 
taxes and duties can be also considered as regionally specific subsidies and exports from 
these zones that benefit from such subsidy can be countervailed. 
 
 
VI Concluding Observations 
 
Brazil and Korea being ‘other’ developing Member countries have to phase out 
their export subsidies soon. However, exports from these countries can get the benefit of 
production subsidies. But these subsidies are actionable. In case of production subsidies, 
the specificity test becomes important. That is, a government program may prime facie be 
non-specific (that is, neutral in nature and is not seen to be benefiting any particular 
region or industry) but may de facto be specific, in which case it qualifies as production 
subsidy and hence an action can be taken in the form of imposition of CVDs. However, 
India being Annex VII Member country is allowed to give export subsidy but such 
subsidies are also actionable. Not all exporters avail of various export promotion 
programs and not all Member countries impose CVDs. In the absence of any solid 
quantitative study on the net benefit of various export subsidies, policy makers have to 
                                                                                                                                                 
40  Under this program, companies operating in manufacturing or mining, or in a business prescribed by the 
Presidential Decree, are allowed to appropriate reserve funds to cover the expenses needed for 
development or innovation of technology. Differential treatment given to capital goods and capital 
intensive industries on one hand and all other industry on the other makes the program specific and 
confers financial benefit. 
41  Under this program KXMB charges lower interest rate on foreign investments. But this facility is not 
linked to export performance and therefore it is not an export subsidy but a more general subsidy. 
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exercise their judgement in deciding whether or not to give subsidies and in choosing 
appropriate type of subsidies. 
 
Based on the foregone analysis of Brazil and Korea one can make some 
observations. One is that the export subsidies are in general on the decline. However, 
subsidy in the form of export finance is still common. Besides, government is 
increasingly providing exporters with generalised support functions such as export 
logistics, export data, market information, training to exporters, identifying potential 
markets, improving product quality and standards and so on. These support functions 
have positive externalities, as once these benefits are provided these become available to 
several exporters at the same time. These functions are beneficial for small and medium 
exporters who can ill afford to invest in such activities. Perhaps because these functions 
are not directly linked to export performance and because the amount spent is not high, 
these kind of functions of the government in Brazil and Korea, as also in other countries, 
have not attracted CVDs. 
 
Small and medium exporters played an important role in exports from a country. 
Because of high concentration of exports in both Brazil and Korea, governments in these 
countries are currently laying special emphasis on promotion of exports through small 
and medium enterprises. Many quasi-government agencies, state promotion boards and 
other private sector associations are playing important role in promotion of exports. 
 
Exports from the two countries have been countervailed on account of export 
subsidies as well as production subsidies. Exports from Brazil and Korea seem to have 
benefited from production subsidies more than exports from India. This is certainly true 
of steel exports that have been countervailed by the USA from all three countries. 
Production subsidies are given both in discretionary and non-discretionary ways. 
Government owned companies, particularly in the steel industry have been the recipient 
of non-discretionary benefits in a variety of ways. 
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Despite the fact that subsidy provisions differ with respect to Brazil and India, 
India could still join with countries like Brazil who are giving drawback benefit on 
import of capital goods used in export production, in asking for the improvements 
(particularly, allowing drawback, refund, remission of duties on import of capital goods 
used in export production) in the Agreement in the next round. 
 
Both Brazil and Korea have long moved to VAT system of tax.42 Because of the 
administrative ease and simplicity of VAT, not only that double taxation of inputs is 
avoided but also any possibility of excess drawback or refund of taxes on inputs used in 
exports can be checked. For this reason none of the drawback schemes in Brazil and 
Korea has been countervailed.43 India has not yet moved fully to VAT. This is considered 
to be the reason behind the complicated tax refund schemes that have been countervailed 
by some Member countries. In particular, the Duty Entitlement Passbook Scheme has 
been countervailed. EC and US have countervailed the scheme for the full benefit and not 
just the excess benefit provided under the scheme. 
 
Like India, Brazil too has Special free-trade zones. These zones are considered to 
be in territory outside Brazil for the purpose of customs control. Units in these zones are 
exempted from customs duty and administrative restrictions and controls for goods 
imported or exported. If these zones also allow duty free import of capital goods (not 
allowed to units located outside these zones) without there being any link with the export 
obligation then such a scheme is not an export subsidy but a regionally specific subsidy. 
For countries like Brazil for whom export subsidies will soon be prohibited, this type of 
subsidy is not prohibited but can surely invite CVDs. Setting up infrastructure in these 
zones and making space available at a rate lower than at which it is available outside 
these zones though not directly linked to exports, still constitutes a regionally specific 
subsidy. Similarly export promotion programs that are of a general nature such as export 
                                                 
42  Korea introduced the Value Added Tax system on July 1, 1977. 
43  Except for one scheme in Korea called fixed amount refund system that was countervailed by the EC on 
import of stainless steel wires. Despite the fact that full benefit (not just the excess benefit) under the 
scheme was countervailed, the total benefit from several export promotion programs was found to be 
below de minimis level and hence the case was dropped. 
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market development are not linked to exports performance seems to be alright as per the 
agreement. 
 
Finally, high cost and lack of easy accessibility of credit in developing countries 
(especially Annex VII countries) due to several reasons such as capital market 
imperfections, calls for government intervention in providing subsidised export credit to 
its exporters. There is a genuine case for giving such a benefit to exporters (Sucupira & 
Moreira). Maybe developing countries can collectively make a case for it or can ‘buy’ 
this option by making concessions elsewhere in the next round of negotiations. 
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Table 1 a 
CVD Measures in Force Against Exports from Brazil by WTO Members as on 
December 31, 2000 
 
Member Countries 
 
Products 
Canada Stainless Steel Round Bar  
USA Brass Sheet & Strip 
Cut-to-Length Carbon Steel Plate 
Iron Construction Castings 
Mexico Hot-rolled sheet 
Cold-rolled sheet 
Plate in Coils 
 
 
Source: Reports of Countervailing Duty Actions downloaded from WTO website 
 
 
 
 
Table 1 b 
CVD cases initiated against exports from Brazil by WTO Members for the period 
1st July – 31st December 2000 
 
Member Countries 
 
Products  
Canada Stainless Steel Round Bar 
 
Source: Semi-Annual Reports of CVD Actions downloaded from WTO website 
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Table 2 a 
CVD Measures in Force against Exports from South Korea by WTO Members as 
on December 31 2000 
 
Member Countries 
 
Products 
USA Certain Cut-to-Length Carbon Quality Steel 
Corrosion-Resistant Carbon Steel 
Stainless Steel Sheet and Strip in Coils 
Structural Steel Beams 
Top-of-the-Stove Stainless Steel Cooking Ware 
 
Source: Reports of Countervailing Duty Actions downloaded from WTO website 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2 b 
CVD Cases Initiated Against Exports from South Korea by WTO Members for the 
Period 1st July – 31st December 2000 
 
Member Countries Products 
USA Stainless Steel and Strip in Coils 
Structural Steel Beams  
Republic of Korea Polyethylene Terephthalate (PET)  
South Africa Wire Ropes 
 
Source: Semi-annual reports of CVD actions downloaded from WTO website 
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